What I am working on now

Current work

New working paper The Bagehot Problem at Fifty Charles Nolan
Working paper Information-Sharing Protocols and Reputation in Two-Tier Fiscal Governance with Campbell Leith and Graeme Roy
In preparation Who Controls the Clock? Fiscal Calendars and Informational Independence with Campbell Leith and Graeme Roy Coming soon
In preparation Ringfencing with Alfred Duncan and João Pedro De Camargo Mainente Coming soon
Revision underway Structure and Resolution in Banking: Are They Substitutes? with Alfred Duncan

Research themes

Research

Monetary and financial stability: history and institutions

Work on the origins and evolution of UK monetary and financial stability, linking historical episodes and ideas from Adam Smith onward to modern institutional design.

Macroprudential architecture

Ring-fencing, resolution, systemic loss, and the interaction between structural separability and credible crisis management — including the modern form of Hirsch’s “Bagehot Problem”.

Monetary and macroprudential policy

How monetary and financial-stability policies should interact when risk-taking is privately optimal but socially costly.

Housing and labour-market search

Joint search frictions in housing and labour markets, including the interaction of major UK reforms during the 1980s.

Multi-level fiscal governance

Information sharing, fiscal calendars, forecast reconciliation risk, institutional independence, and reputation in two-tier fiscal systems.

Continuous-time macroeconomics

Stochastic overlapping-generations models, martingale methods, and continuous-time approaches to aggregate consumption, investment, and portfolio choice.

Drafts and working papers Working papers Click to open
  1. The Bagehot Problem at Fifty: Can Resolution and Ring-Fencing Reconcile Financial Stability with Market Discipline?
    Charles Nolan.
    Key argument: modern resolution tackles Hirsch’s original Bagehot Problem by protecting functions rather than firms; its limit is where critical functions cannot be cleanly separated from the organisations that produce them, leaving a possible ex ante role for ring-fencing.
    Abstract

    In 1977 Fred Hirsch argued that lender-of-last-resort support creates a problem deeper than moral hazard. Public crisis insurance weakens private discipline, yet its substitutes distort competition: informal control restricts entry, while reliance on failure favours banks authorities are least willing to let fail. That was Hirsch's Bagehot Problem. Fifty years later, formal supervision and resolution have changed the choice. Resolution seeks to restore credible loss-bearing by separating the fate of the firm from the continuity of its critical functions. But some functions depend on information, relationships and operational capabilities embedded in the organisation itself, so that separation cannot be assumed. The modern Bagehot Problem is whether critical functions can be protected without again protecting the institutions that produce them. Ring-fencing matters as it creates some of that separability before failure.

  2. A Simple Prudential-Effort Foundation for the Financial Trilemma
    Charles Nolan.
    Key result: a simple ex ante prudential-effort model where financial integration amplifies cross-border crisis risk provides a useful formalisation of the financial trilemma without relying on equilibrium selection.
    Abstract

    The financial trilemma asserts that deep financial integration, purely national financial policies and financial stability cannot simultaneously be achieved. Existing formalizations employing ex post burden-sharing games imply the trilemma result hinges on equilibrium selection. We develop a minimal ex ante prudential-effort model where financial integration amplifies cross-border crisis risk and national regulators internalise only part of global losses. The unique symmetric Nash equilibrium underprovides prudential effort and cannot deliver first-best stability when both integration and national policy autonomy are high. That provides a unique-equilibrium foundation for the financial trilemma and clarifies when supranational prudential arrangements are needed.

  3. Information-Sharing Protocols and Reputation in Two-Tier Fiscal Governance
    Campbell Leith; Graeme Roy; Charles Nolan.
    Focus: how independent fiscal institutions at different tiers should coordinate information, assumptions and timetables while remaining demonstrably independent.
  4. Searching for Flexibility: The Joint Impact of Thatcher’s Reforms of UK Labour and Housing Markets
    Tatiana Kirsanova; Øyvind Masst; Charles Nolan.
    Key result: housing shocks explain roughly half of unemployment volatility; tenure shifts sharply towards ownership while average affordability changes modestly.
    Abstract

    We quantify the macroeconomic effects of major housing- and labour-market reforms in the United Kingdom during the 1980s. We estimate a small New Keynesian DSGE model with search frictions in both labour and housing markets to evaluate the collapse in public construction, the Right to Buy programme, the decline in trade-union bargaining power, and the shift in monetary policy.

    We find strong cross-market spillovers: housing-market shocks account for roughly half of the volatility in unemployment and job search, and tight housing markets significantly dampen job creation. Counterfactual experiments imply that the observed fall in union bargaining power lowered the mid-1980s unemployment peak by about two percentage points relative to a no-reform path.

    The housing reforms tilt tenure sharply towards ownership and keep house-price-to-earnings ratios under sustained pressure, but taken together the reforms generate only modest changes in average affordability. In welfare terms, the negative effects of lower public construction are more than offset by the combination of lower unemployment and higher housing-service consumption, yielding a net welfare gain of around one percent in consumption-equivalent terms.

  5. Monetary and Financial Policy with Privately Optimal Risk Taking
    Alfred Duncan; João Pedro De Camargo Mainente; Charles Nolan.
    Key result: macroprudential tools cannot fully internalise leverage externalities; monetary policy retains a financial-stability role but can risk unstable inflation.
    Abstract

    We study how monetary and macroprudential policy should interact in a New Keynesian model with privately optimal, but socially risky, leverage. Entrepreneurs finance idiosyncratically risky projects under imperfect state verification, generating endogenous leverage, factor wedges, and an equity premium, even when aggregate risk is traded.

    Higher household risk aversion produces a “paradox of safety”: stronger demand for safe assets concentrates risk on entrepreneurial balance sheets, raising the welfare cost of cycles. Macroprudential tools act on leverage and balance-sheet exposures but cannot fully internalise associated externalities. A financial-stability role for monetary policy therefore remains—especially for temporary shocks—yet a regime that leans too hard on this role risks losing control of inflation.

  6. Prudential Fiscal Stimulus
    Alfred Duncan; Charles Nolan.
    Key result: crisis-contingent wage subsidies can raise welfare even without standard demand or labour-market externalities, by improving ex ante incentives.
    Abstract

    When government fiscal interventions are predictable, private incentives are distorted. If firms anticipate fiscal stimulus in a crisis, they may take on excessive risk today. How can fiscal interventions be designed to mitigate moral hazard, and can such interventions be time consistent?

    We show that stimulus programmes can be designed to induce precautionary behaviour ex ante, and we label these programmes prudential fiscal stimulus. We demonstrate the theory with a wage-subsidy stimulus policy. Countercyclical wage subsidies can be welfare-improving even in the absence of aggregate demand or labour-market externalities. Prudential fiscal stimulus is time inconsistent, but the presence of aggregate demand externalities can bring discretionary policies closer to the optimum.

  7. Aggregate Investment and Consumption in a Continuous-Time Stochastic Blanchard-Yaari Model with CRRA Utility: A Martingale Approach
    Christian Oliver Ewald; Kevin Kamm; Charles Nolan; Aihua Zhang.
    Key result: martingale methods deliver closed-form aggregate consumption and portfolio allocations in a continuous-time stochastic OLG model with systematic risk.
    Abstract

    We develop a continuous-time stochastic overlapping-generations model featuring agents who face constant mortality risk and have constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) preferences. The economy includes both a risk-free bond and a risky asset that captures systematic shocks. Unlike prior models that rely on discrete time or focus on idiosyncratic risk only, our approach captures aggregate stochastic dynamics under systematic risk.

    Using martingale methods, we derive closed-form expressions for individual and aggregate consumption, portfolio allocation, and human and financial wealth. A further contribution is a rigorous treatment of stochastic processes defined on the entire real line, which arise naturally in continuous-time stochastic overlapping-generations models.

    As an application, we analyse a small open economy subject to foreign exchange risk. Moderate exchange-rate volatility can raise aggregate consumption, while higher risk aversion can raise aggregate financial wealth. The model nests the classical Blanchard–Yaari framework as a deterministic special case and supports extensions involving stochastic income, incomplete markets, and the study of higher-order moments and distributions of aggregate variables.

  8. Structure and Resolution in Banking: Are They Substitutes?
    Alfred Duncan; Charles Nolan.
    Key result: better resolution can weaken the case for structural separation when separation mainly reduces costly failures, but it cannot substitute for the effects of structure on information, allocation and risk-taking before failure.
    Abstract

    Can modern bank resolution make permanent structural restrictions such as ring-fencing less necessary? Our answer is qualified: better resolution can reduce the case for structural restrictions when those restrictions mainly reduce how often costly failure occurs, but it cannot replace what structure changes before failure. We study a bank in which organisation shapes decisions before failure, while the resolution regime determines how failure is handled afterwards. Flexibility allows headquarters to move business towards better opportunities and, holding information fixed, creates fewer fragile exposures. But it also weakens local managers’ incentives to acquire borrower-specific information. If that response is strong enough, a structural boundary can reduce fragility even at the cost of lower normal-time output. After failure, a resolution regime can rely on arrangements put in place in advance or adapt its response to the circumstances that arise. The first is more reliable; the second may fit the problem better but may not be implemented in time. If a structural boundary reduces how often costly failure occurs, better resolution is less valuable because it is needed less often. But resolution cannot undo changes in information, allocation or risk-taking that have already occurred before failure, and organisation may also change what a failed bank looks like when it reaches resolution.

Book manuscript

Under preparation for Cambridge University Press

Provisional title: Controlling Money and Credit: The Origins of Central Banking in the UK

Joint with Dr Alfred Duncan

Our current focus is the development of monetary and financial stability in Britain from Adam Smith through the Suspension and Resumption of cash payments to the aftermath of the financial crisis of 1825–26.

Book chapters in draft 7 chapters · all coming soon
Bank Governance, Before the Fact: Adam Smith’s Rules on Banking and MoneyIn draft · coming soon
Central Banking, Before the Fact: The Suspension and other PoliciesIn draft · coming soon
Central Banking, Before the Fact: Suspension-Era Debates and TheoriesIn draft · coming soon
Havoc with the Specie Points: A Model of the Bullionist Controversy, 1797–1821In draft · coming soon
Monetary Policy During the Restriction and Resumption of the Gold Standard, 1797–1830In draft · coming soon
The British Financial Crisis of 1825/26In draft · coming soon
From Goods to Bank Money: The Uneven Legal Construction of Britain’s Paper-Credit Economy, c. 1800–1842In draft · coming soon
Journal articles Past and recent publications Click to open

Recent

  1. Nolan, Charles (2026). A Simple Prudential-Effort Foundation for the Financial Trilemma. Economics Letters, 262, 112879. doi
  2. Ewald, Christian Oliver; Nolan, Charles (2024). On the adaptation of the Lagrange formalism to continuous time stochastic optimal control: a Lagrange-Chow redux. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 162, 104855. doi
  3. Duncan, Alfred; Nolan, Charles (2023). Adam Smith and the bankers: retrospect and prospect. National Institute Economic Review, 265(1), 70–104. doi
  4. Damjanovic, Tatiana; Damjanovic, Vladislav; Nolan, Charles (2021). Unconditionally optimal Ramsey policy. Journal of Macroeconomics, 69, 103346. doi
  5. Kirsanova, Tatiana; Nolan, Charles; Shafiei Deh Abad, Maryam (2021). Deep recessions. Economic Modelling, 96, 310–323. doi
  6. Damjanovic, Tatiana; Damjanovic, Vladislav; Nolan, Charles (2020). Default, bailouts and the vertical structure of financial intermediaries. Review of Economic Dynamics, 38, 154–180. doi
  7. Duncan, Alfred; Nolan, Charles (2019). Disputes, debt and equity. Theoretical Economics, 14(3), 887–925. doi
Earlier publications
  1. Duncan, Alfred; Nolan, Charles (2020). Reform of the UK Financial Policy Committee. Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 67(1), 1–30. doi
  2. Kontonikas, Alexandros; Nolan, Charles; Zekaite, Zivile; Lamla, Michael (2019). Treasuries variance decomposition and the impact of monetary policy. International Journal of Finance and Economics, 24, 1506–1519. doi
  3. Nolan, Charles; Trew, Alex (2015). Transaction costs and institutions: investments in exchange. B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 15(2), 391–432. doi
  4. Damjanovic, Tatiana; Damjanovic, Vladislav; Nolan, Charles (2015). Ordering Policy Rules with an Unconditional Welfare Measure. International Journal of Central Banking, 11(1), 103–149.
  5. Damjanovic, Vladislav; Nolan, Charles (2012). S,s pricing in a dynamic equilibrium model with heterogeneous sectors. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 36(4), 550–567. doi
  6. Damjanovic, Tatiana; Nolan, Charles (2011). Second-order approximation to the Rotemberg model around a distorted steady state. Economics Letters, 110(2), 132–135. doi
  7. Damjanovic, T.; Nolan, C. (2010). Relative price distortions and inflation persistence. Economic Journal, 120(547), 1080–1099. doi
  8. Damjanovic, T.; Nolan, C. (2010). Seigniorage-maximizing inflation under sticky prices. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 42(2–3), 503–519. doi
  9. Nolan, C.; Thoenissen, C. (2009). Financial shocks and the US business cycle. Journal of Monetary Economics, 56(4), 596–604. doi
  10. Nolan, Charles; Thoenissen, Christoph (2008). Labour markets and firm-specific capital in New Keynesian general equilibrium models. Journal of Macroeconomics, 30(3), 817–843. doi
  11. Damjanovic, T.; Damjanovic, V.; Nolan, C. (2008). Unconditionally optimal monetary policy. Journal of Monetary Economics, 55(3), 491–500. doi

Background

Bio

I am the Bonar-MacFie Chair of Political Economy at the University of Glasgow. I was educated at the University of Strathclyde and Birkbeck College, University of London. I worked for eight years at the Bank of England, first as a banking supervisor and then as an economist in the Monetary Assessment and Strategy Division.

I lectured at the University of Reading and was Reader in Economics at the University of Durham. Prior to joining the University of Glasgow in 2010, I was Professor of Economics at the University of St Andrews, where I co-founded the Centre for Dynamic Macroeconomic Analysis with Jagjit Chadha.

I was an Associate Editor of the European Economic Review (2014–2025) and I sit on the International Advisory Board of the Scottish Journal of Political Economy. I am a Fellow of the Royal Society of Edinburgh (elected 2015) and was President of the Scottish Economic Society between 2020 and 2023.

I was a Commissioner of the Scottish Fiscal Commission (2016–2017).

Get in touch

Contact

Charles Nolan
Professor of Economics
Assistant Head of School – Director of Faculty
Adam Smith Business School
University of Glasgow

2 Discovery Place
Glasgow G11 6EY
United Kingdom

Email: charles.nolan@glasgow.ac.uk